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NOTES
Compensatory Racial Redistricting: United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey
Pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,' the State of New
York submitted its 1972 reapportionment plan for Kings County to the
United States Attorney General. He denied approval of certain state legisla-

tive districts because the state had failed to show that the redistricting
conformed to the Act. After informal consultation with the Attorney General's Office, the state submitted a revised plan which retained the original
number of nonwhite majority districts, but which increased the percentages
of nonwhites in the disputed districts. In order to gain this increase, the
revised plan split the Hasidic Jewish community, 2 which had previously
been contained in a single district, into different districts having a minimum
nonwhite population of sixty-five percent. Representatives of the Hasidic

community brought an action against New York officials and the United
States Attorney General, alleging that their rights under the Voting Rights

Act and the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments 3 were violated by diluting
their vote. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint, 4 and

the Second Circuit upheld the district court in a divided opinion.5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: the state's use of explicit
racial criteria in order to obtain the Attorney General's approval of reapportionment under the Voting Rights Act did not violate fourteenth or fifteenth

amendment rights of majority voters. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996, 51 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1977).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). This provision of the Act requires states or political subdivisions subject to § 4 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970), to obtain approval of changes in voting
procedures, including redistricting, by either submitting them to the Attorney General or filing
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
2. The community is tightly knit both geographically and socially. Its 30,000 members are
concentrated in the Williamsburgh area of Brooklyn where unique social and religious practices
reflect 19th century life in small towns in Poland.
3. The equal protection clause forbids any state to "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Id. amend XV, § 1.
4. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 377 F. Supp. 1164
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
5. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1975). The circuit court held that plaintiffs had no standing as members of the Jewish community to assert rights under the Voting Rights Act; although the plaintiffs had standing as white
voters to assert the violation of fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights, the Court held that
there was no violation of these rights. The issue of standing as members of the Hasidic
community to complain as minorities under the Voting Rights Act was not appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The circuit court decision is discussed and evaluated in Note, ProportionalRepresentationby
Race: The Constitutionality of Benign Racial Redistricting, 74 MicH. L. REV. 820 (1976)
(decision improper because purpose and possible effect of conscious use of racial criteria is to
dilute the voting power of nonminority members and thereby diminish their constitutional right
of political access); 63 GEO. L.J. 1321 (1975) (decision approved because noncolorblind criteria
permissible in remedial contexts); 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1496 (1975) (decision approved because required to achieve Attorney General's approval and permitted by political considerations approved in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)).
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VOTING RIGHTS, REAPPORTIONMENT,
AND BENIGN DISCRIMINATION

The Voting Rights Act of 19656 may be seen as the culmination of twentieth century judicial and legislative efforts to protect the franchise legally
extended to blacks by the fifteenth amendment in 1870. 7 In a series of
decisions in the late 1960's and early 1970's the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,' and held that apportionment and redistricting decisions
fell within its scope. By that time the Court had overcome its traditional
reluctance to become involved in redistricting litigation and had decided
cases under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 9
In Gaffney v. Cummings' I the Supreme Court considered political rather
than racial redistricting. Connecticut explicitly based its reapportionment on
a political fairness principle that would guarantee representation of Republicans and Democrats in the legislature in roughly the same proportion as
they existed in the population." The Court approved the use of these
specific goals. Conceding that district lines could not be drawn in the
absence of political knowledge, the Court stated that "it is most unlikely
that the political impact of such a plan would remain undiscovered by the
time it was proposed or adopted, in which event the results would be both
known and, if not changed, intended.' 2 Although Gaffney involved politic-

al redistricting, race was mentioned in Justice White's majority opinion; he
suggested that different results might occur "if racial or political groups
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970).
7. The legal background of United Jewish Organizations implicitly reflects moral, political, and legal ideals of equality applied to treatment of racial minorities in the area of voting and
redistricting. Treatment of racial minorities may be analyzed by considering two competing
ideals of equality. See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235 (1971). The "equal achievement" ideal is primarily result or end oriented; the "equal
treatment" ideal is primarily means or opportunity oriented.
For an early use of similar concepts in the area of voting qualifications see Fiss, Gaston
County v. United States: The Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 379. The
analysis is useful in understanding discussions of redistricting. The ideal of equal achievement
supports proportional or "equal" representation; the ideal of equal treatment supports an

"equal" vote irrespective of the representation that results. See generally, Note, Reapportionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or Equal Vote?, 50 B.U.L.
REV. 231 (1970); Note, Proportional Representation by Race: The Constitutionality of Benign
Racial Redistricting, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 820 (1976).

8. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) (state reapportionment decisions within scope of Act); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (shift from
district-based to at-large voting within scope of Act); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966) (specific remedies authorized by Act, including requirements of Attorney General
approval involved in United Jewish Organizations, approved).
9. Prior to Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (state plan redrawing city boundaries disenfranchised black voters contrary to the fifteenth amendment), and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) (beginnings of one-man, one-vote doctrine), the Court had held redistricting
controversies to be nonjusticiable under the political questions doctrine. Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946). The one-man, one-vote decisions were based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377'U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See the cases collected in Annot., Diluting Effect of Minorities' Votes
by Adoption of Particular Election Plan, or Gerrymandering of Election District, as Violation of
Equal Protection Clause of Federal Constitution, 27 A.L.R. FED. 29 (1976).
10. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
11. Id. at 752. Viewed in terms of equal achievement or equal treatment, the Court
approved an application of the ideal of equal achievement to political redistricting. See note 7
supra (distinction between equal treatment and equal achievement).
12. 412 U.S. at 753.
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have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength
invidiously minimized."' 3
The Court, in City of Richmond v. United States,'14 considered a racial
redistricting situation. The Supreme Court held that the annexation of a
predominantly white area to the city did not deny or abridge, under section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, the right of blacks to vote in the enlarged postannexation city. The Court, however, based its reasoning on the grounds
that, at the time the plan was upheld, the city had shifted from an at-large
plan for the election of the city council to a district system that preserved
5
black voting strength.
In Beer v. United States 6 the Court held that a reapportionment plan for
New Orleans city council districts had neither the purpose nor the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. The Court
indicated, however, that abridgement of the franchise, and, thus, violation
of the Voting Rights Act, would be found if the proposed change would lead
to a "retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.' 17 The New Orleans reapportionment did not constitute a retrogression because the number of black
18
majority districts was increased.

II.

UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS OF WILLIAMSBURGH, INC. V. CAREY

Development of new remedial devices such as busing,' 9 affirmative action
in employment, 20 and preferential admissions 2' has led to concern over
13. Id. at 754.
14. 422 U.S. 358 (1975). City of Richmond was decided after the circuit court decision in
United Jewish Organizations.
15. Id. at 370. The Court considered the ideal of equal achievement in the sense of
proportional representation as an important factor whether or not it had been explicitly considered by the city. See note 7 supra (distinction between equal treatment and equal achievement).
16. 425 U.S. 130 (976). The Beer decision is discussed in 60 MARQ. L. REV. 173 (1976)
(concluding the nonretrogression test far too weak). Along with City of Richmond, Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977), Beer has been widely deplored as signaling the
Court's retreat from affirmative eradication of racial discrimination. Cf. 425 U.S. at 143-63
(dissenting opinions of White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.) (Beer test too weak).
17. 425 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). The Beer nonretrogression test is achievement rather
than treatment oriented; it emphasizes the results of redistricting rather than the process by
which the lines are drawn.
18. The nonretrogression test is only a preliminary test; passing it alone is not sufficient to
justify constitutional approval. If no retrogression is found it must still be determined that the
redistricting meets fourteenth amendment requirements. 425 U.S. at 141. See also 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 173, 180 (1976).
19. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971) (affirmative action program based on executive order for government
contractors on construction projects upheld). For a discussion of the cases on reverse discrimination in employment see Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 13 (1976).
21. Compare Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
320 (1974), and the majority opinion in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553
P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Feb. 2, 1977) (preferential admissions programs unconstitutional), with Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39
N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976), and the dissenting opinion in Bakke, 18
Cal. 3d at 54, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (preferential admissions constitutionally
permissible).
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reverse discrimination 22 in the area of voting rights and redistricting.23 The
existence of reverse discrimination against white voters was at issue in
United Jewish Organizations through New York's use of explicit racial
quotas. The quotas were derived from informal consultation with the Attorney General in order to satisfy the federal requirement of the Voting Rights
Act. 24 The Court's holding that no constitutional discrimination existed in

the revised redistricting plan "carries us further down the road of racethe sericentered remedial devices than we have heretofore traveled-with
25
matters."
such
attend
that
fairness
of
ous questions
Without being able to agree on a majority opinion, four of the members of
the Court agreed 26 with the Second Circuit that (1) the use of racial criteria in
drawing district lines may be required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
(2) the use of racial criteria is not limited to remedies of explicit prior
discrimination, and (3) the use of numerical racial quotas in establishing
certain black majority districts does not automatically violate the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. Writing for the plurality, Justice White agreed
with the lower court's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act and its interpretation of the decisions upholding the Act's constitutionality. 27 Given
the proper application of the Act's triggering device and its constitutionality, 28 the use of explicit racial criteria is appropriate whether or not there is a
finding of prior discrimination.29
Justice White went further than the Second Circuit in his discussion of the
applicability of Beer 30 and City of Richmond.31 The use of numerical racial
quotas was found permissible in the absence of a showing that New York

had done any more than was required to obtain approval under the Beer test:
22. There is no generally accepted definition of the contrast between "benign discrimination" and "reverse discrimination." When applied to preferential treatment for previously
unjustly disadvantaged groups, "benign discrimination" suggests a treatment that is morally
and legally permissible, and perhaps even desirable or obligatory. "Reverse discrimination,"
however, suggests undesirable treatment that may be morally impermissible or unconstitutional. Other descriptive content of the terms must be gained from the context in which each writer
uses them. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 1012, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 249 (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. An explanation of the increased concern over this issue and an interesting analysis of
some of the moral questions posed can be found in Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory
Discrimination, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 348 (1973). See also Note, Compensatory
Racial Reapportionment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 84 (1972) (recommending use of balancing test).
24. Although the 65% figure was not explicitly mentioned by Justice Department officials,
that 65
a staff member of the reapportionment committee testified that he "got the feeling ...
percent would be probably an approved figure" after discussions over the phone and in person.
510 F.2d at 527. That also was the figure used by the NAACP to reflect "safe" black majority
districts. The basis for this figure seems to be that a higher percentage of white residents than
nonwhite residents are eligible to vote. 97 S. Ct. at 1009 n.22, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 245 n.22.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 1011, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 248. Preferential treatment on the basis of race, even
of the previously disadvantaged, raises such questions as whether the purported preferential
treatment disguises a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment; whether it serves to
stimulate society's latent race consciousness; whether it conforms minority stereotypes of
dependency; whether it causes strong feelings of injustice in those on whom the burden is
placed; and whether the burdens are distributed fairly among majority members. Id. at 1013-16,
51 L. Ed. 2d at 248-53 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun join in this portion of Justice White's
opinion.
27. 510 F.2d at 522-25.
28. See notes 7-8 supra.
29. 97 S. Ct. at 1005, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 240-41.
30. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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reapportionment must not lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities regarding their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.

Under the Voting Rights Act the Attorney General is required to condition
his approval of reapportionment on satisfaction of the Beer test. To meet the
test, consideration must be given to the number of black majority districts.
In order to be a black majority district satisfying the Voting Rights Act, both
Beer and City of Richmond require some figure higher than fifty percent.
"But whatever the specific percentage, the State will inevitably arrive at it
as a necessary means to ensure the opportunity for the election of a black
representative and to obtain approval of its reapportionment plan. ' 32 Thus,
the use of some specific numerical quotas is required and a redistricting does

not violate the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments merely by using such
quotas.
Given the emphasis in Beer on the "effective exercise of the electoral

franchise," 33 the four-member plurality concluded that the Attorney General's belief that a nonwhite population majority in the vicinity of sixty-five
percent would be necessary to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters
was a reasonable one. Since the plaintiffs failed to show that the Attorney
General required more than the fulfillment of the nonretrogression principle,34 they did not establish that the final redistricting plan was unconstitutional. 35
Part IV of Justice White's opinion relied heavily on Gaffney v. Cum-

mings36 to establish the lack of any invidious purpose. According to White,
the 1974 plan could "be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of political power
between white and nonwhite voters in Kings County." 37 Seen in this light
the plan had neither an impermissible purpose 3 nor an impermissible effect.39 Thus, White relied on a racial fairness principle which was analogous
32. 97 S. Ct. at 1008, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 244.
33. 425 U.S. at 141.
34. 97 S.Ct. at 1009, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 245. Since there was not an attempt at such a showing,
and since Beer and City of Richmond were decided after the lower court decisions, the Chief
Justice believed the case should be remanded. Id. at 1019, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 257. Although it might
seem that a showing that either the legislature or the Attorney General exceeded the Beer
requirements would be sufficient, that is not the case. The Voting Rights Act fixes venue in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, and limits standing to complain of noncompliance
with the Act by the Department of Justice to the state or political subdivision. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1970). Consequently, the Eastern District of New York was not the proper forum, and the
plaintiffs lacked standing to complain of the Attorney General's actions.
35. 510 F.2d at 525. Although the circuit court relied on the Voting Rights Act to uphold
New York's actions, Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist endorsed the broader view that
the Constitution permits racial considerations as a tool to protect minority voting strength,
irrespective of the congressional authority.
36. 412 U.S. 735 (1973); see notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 1011, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 247. Professor Gunther of Stanford University has
suggested that the Court is moving toward a theory of equal protection "with bite" which no
longer finds acceptable the practice of postulating possible legitimate ends for the state but
which demands evidence of actual state ends in legislative history. Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
38. The plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other
race." 97 S. Ct. at 1009, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 246.
39. "Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in
the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white
voting strength." Id. at 1010, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 246.
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to the political fairness principle held to be acceptable in Gaffney. The racial
representation in districts was fair under the revised plan because it left a
proportion of minority districts in Kings County that were less than or equal
to the proportion of minority population.4 ° In such a situation the interests of
white residents of black majority districts, insofar as particular interests are
racially linked, will continue to be represented by those legislators elected
41
from districts with white majorities.
Justice White viewed this situation as similar to one presented when a
political unit changes from an at-large voting system to a districting system
so as to increase minority representation by preventing minorities from
being "repeatedly outvoted. ' 42 White would approve of the hypothetical
situation and the 1974 redistricting changes on the basis of the same racial

fairness principle. Both should be permitted provided the majority still has
"fair" representation and no other constitutional provisions are violated.4 3
Justice Brennan did not join in this portion of White's opinion, wishing to
postpone "this thorny question until another day" and having serious
doubts about the applicability of Gaffney as a political redistricting case to
reapportionment by race."4 In his concurring opinion he pointed out some of
the policy problems with minority preferential treatment, but he indicated
45
that the Voting Rights Act avoided or mitigated these problems
Justice Stewart's separate concurring opinion, joined in by Justice Powell,
emphasized the lack of any showing of purposeful discrimination.' Although discriminatory impact and awareness of race both provide some
evidence of an invidious purpose,47 here there was no discriminatory impact
because of the overall proportions of minority and majority districts within
the county. While there was awareness of race, "[s]uch awareness is not
. . .the equivalent of discriminatory intent."4 Here the inference to invidious purpose is prevented because the clear purpose of the legislature was to
49
comply with the Voting Rights Act.
40. In Kings County the revised plan left white majorities in approximately 70% of the
districts when the county population was 65% white.
41. 97 S. Ct. at 1010 n.24, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 246 n.24 (citing 25 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1972)); see
note 23 supra and accompanying text.
42. 97 S. Ct. at 1011, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 247.
43. Id. White's opinion raises interesting questions about the application of a racial fairness
principle to nonvoting contexts such as employment or college admissions. Is Part IV of his
opinion, which is unnecessary as a basis for affirming the lower court, an attempt to line up
support for such a principle in other areas? The similarity with the language of the dissent in
Bakke (see note 21 supra) suggests it may be. On the other hand, Justice White's previous
defenses of the right to vote as fundamental suggest he may be trying to preserve a racial
fairness principle in the voting area even though he finds it inapplicable elsewhere. See
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970).
44. 97 S. Ct. at 1012-13, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 249.
45. Id.at 1011-16, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 248-54; see note 25 supra.
46. "Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether the reapportionment
represents purposeful discrimination against white voters." 97 S. Ct. at 1017, 51 L. Ed.2d at
254 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
47. 97 S. Ct. at 1017, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55 (citing Arlington Heights and City of
Richmond).
48. 97 S. Ct. at 1017, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 255.
49. Id. Decisions making it more difficult to show invidious discrimination against
minorities may also operate to make it easier for voluntary preferential treatment of minorities,
such as that inBakke and United Jewish Organizations, to pass court scrutiny. Ifpreferential
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Chief Justice Burger's dissent opposed any use of quotas or mechanical
"racial gerrymandering" 5 ° by means of a two-stage argument. First, he
argued against Part IV of White's opinion on the basis of Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. 51 He argued that New York's actions would not be constitutionally permissible in the absence of the Voting Rights Act by reading Gomillion
as holding that drawing political boundaries "with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a specific racial result cannot ordinarily be squared with the
Constitution. ' 52 The Chief Justice's reading of Gomillion differs from the
rest of the court. They would distinguish Gomillion on the basis of "fencing
out from participation in the political process" or "motivated by racial
animus." 53The second stage of the Chief Justice's argument was directed at
showing that New York's actions are not made constitutionally permissible
by attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. He rejected the use made
by Justice White of the Beer test, but even granted that it was the proper
test, Burger believed the case should have been remanded for further factual
determination since it4 was dismissed at the pleading stage before the Beer
5
test was formulated.

III.

CONCLUSION
In United Jewish Organizations the Supreme Court goes beyond prior
cases to uphold the use of explicit numerical racial goals to obtain Attorney
General approval of redistricting. In the absence of a showing that the
redistricting plan went further than required by the Beer nonretrogression
test, no violation of rights of the white voters existed when their overall
strength was still proportionally represented. The use of a racial fairness
principle by three Justices in approving New York's use of explicit numerical goals, without relying on the Voting Rights Act, and emphasis on lack of
invidious purpose by two more Justices, may herald the acceptability of
other voluntary remedial devices to increase minority achievement.
Calvin B. Almquist

treatment can be put in three constitutional categories, "forbidden," "permitted," and "obligatory," one could describe the Court as expanding the middle category at the expense of the

other two.
50. 97 S.Ct. at 1020, 51 L.Ed. 2d at 259.
51. 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see note 9 supra.
52. 97 S. Ct. at 1016, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 255.
53. Compare id. at 1017-18, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 255 (Burger,J., dissenting), with id. at 1010, 51
L. Ed. 2d at 246 (White,J.,joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.), and id. at 1011, 51 L. Ed. 2d
at 248 (Brennan,J.,concurring), and id. at 1016, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 254 (Stewart, J.,concurring,
joined by Powell, J.).
54. Id. at 1018-19, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 257. Burger suggests that the same standards should be
applied to minorities and majorities irrespective of the intent. In terms of the ideals analysis, the
Chief Justice favors the ideal of equal treatment over the ideal of equal achievement.

